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Abstract
The article depicts symbolic boundary making in the German discourse on
immigration. The analysis addresses the question of how wanted and unwanted
immigrants are socially constructed and thereby differentiated in this discourse. The
media analysis from 2008 to 2014 of so-called poverty migration from Rumania and
Bulgaria and so-called new guest workers from Greece, Italy and Spain suggest that
boundary making against these immigrants shifts from ethnicity and religion to an
individual class-based approach. In this respect, the article discusses how a strong
human rights discourse makes a dominant individualistic class-based definition of (un-)
wanted immigration more likely. However, the analysis also shows that this
construction of desirability refers to the ethnicity of the immigrants. In this sense, ethnic
boundary making is stable in a liberal-universalistic context.
Keywords: Liberal paradox, Boundary making, Germany, Wanted immigrants, Guest
workers, Poverty immigration, Discourse analysis
Introduction
In this paper I draw on the argument that the social inclusion and exclusion of immi-
grants becomes increasingly problematic for those nation states who are under the in-
fluence of a strong human rights discourse. In this sense, some authors see evidence
for a boundary crisis of the liberal nation state due to liberal norms that limit the state
choices of inclusion and exclusion (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg, 2011). The
foundation of this crisis is well known to be the liberal paradox of immigration
(Benhabib, 1999; Freemann, 1986; Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 2005). The liberal paradox
results from the contradictions of various facets of the modern liberal state. According
to Hampshire’s (2013) analysis, the liberal state is a capitalist, a constitutional, a
democratic and a national state. Each facet of the liberal state carries out a different
assessment on immigration. While the constitutional and capitalist facets tend towards
more openness for immigrants, the democratic and nationhood facets are associated
with more restrictive dynamics. Especially, the imperatives between the universalism of
human rights established in the constitution of liberal-democratic nation-states and
the particularism of nationhood is central to the liberal paradox. In this paper I use the
boundary making approach (Wimmer, 2013) to understand the conflictual dynamics of
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the four facets more in detail in order to examine how they interact to produce an
evaluation of (un-)wanted immigration.
More specifically then, how are immigrants categorised and evaluated by actors in the
context of a liberal nation-state that contains both a universal human rights discourse and
particularistic and exclusive national definition of who is (un-)wanted? This symbolic
struggle over the legitimate principle of vision and division on the evaluation and categor-
isation of (un-)wanted immigrants is at the heart of the empirical analysis in this article.
Since religion in Western Europe (Zolberg & Woon, 1999) and especially strong religious
and ethnic boundaries in Germany (Alba, 2005; Diez & Squire, 2008) are seen as the dom-
inant characteristics in the symbolic dimension of the boundary making referring to an
ethnic conceptualization of German nationhood (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans, Stathan,
Giugni, & Passy, 2005), I discuss how class as a generalized category by which I mean
education, occupation, and income has come to replace them.
In the following, I will first describe my theoretical approach to study the boundary
making. I discuss the extent to which a distinction between the wanted and unwanted
immigrants is reflected in a symbolic hierarchy of categories of mobility and migration.
Second, I will give a short overview about my methodological approach. The realisation
of categories is analysed through two case studies. I will explore how the supposedly
wanted “new guest workers” from Spain, Italy and Greece and the unwanted “poverty
immigrants” from Rumania and Bulgaria are represented in the discourse on immigra-
tion in Germany from 2006 until 2014. In the final part, I will compare and discuss the
results of these two intra-European migration cases.
Theoretical approach
The analysis of the social construction of wanted and unwanted immigrants can be ob-
served in diverse arenas of boundary making. This research follows the idea of an ana-
lytic distinction between social and symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).
Intense political and legal research has shown that states are trapped in the liberal para-
dox (Hollifield, 1992) but have also reacted to it (see Orgad, 2015 ch. 4–6 for an over-
view). These studies are concerned with the institutionalised social boundaries
involving primarily citizenship policies (Howard, 2006; Janoski, 2010; Koopmans,
Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012) and studies of integration policies (Banting & Kymlicka,
2013; Goodman, 2010, 2011, 2015; Joppke, 2007). On a very general level, we can
observe in most of the western democracies that citizenship acquisition is becoming
increasingly accessible for migrants. But in this overarching liberal framework some
scholars refer to restrictive trends which have recently been witnessed and coined by
the terms civic integrationism (Joppke, 2007), schmittanian liberalism (Triadafilopou-
los, 2011) or communitarian neoliberalism (van Houdt & Schinkel, 2013; van Houdt,
Suvarierol, & Schinkel, 2011). Thus, these terms point to the fact that “today it’s not a
Question of ‘Who has Access?’ but rather under what conditions does someone with
eligibility obtain citizenship?” (Goodman, 2010, p. 757).
Some scholars interpret these developments as a shift in boundaries: From an ethnic
to a neoliberal form of inclusion and exclusion in which the approach to select immi-
grants on an individual skill level is favoured over a group-based approach (Schmidtke,
2012; Soysal, 2012). What has been less analysed is how the liberal paradox is negoti-
ated within the symbolic dimension of boundary making. The theoretical argument
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states that only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon, they can become
social boundaries like citizenship and integration policies (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).
This means empirically that although recent studies have shown which categories are
active in the symbolic boundary making process across various European countries (for
an overview see Bail, 2008), we need to study further the interaction and symbolic
struggle over the legitimate definition of the categories involved (Bonikowski, 2016). By
identifying actors and coalitions constructing and advancing these legitimate categories
(Cerna, 2009), we can understand why certain symbolic boundaries are drawn in the
first place. Thus, I focus on the elementary strategies of actors drawing boundaries
against immigrants (Wimmer, 2008). Legitimation refers here in a Bourdieu’s notion to
the ability of actors to impose a criterion of evaluation of wanted and unwanted immi-
grants. This requires an intersubjective agreement or disagreement about the standards
against which the immigrants are evaluated (Lamont, 2012).
In order to get an conceptual understanding of who is (un-)wanted, I shall review the
literature that sheds light on how the public symbolically categorise the “wanted and
welcome” and “the wanted and not welcome” immigrants, to quote Zolberg (1987,
p. 37) – ‘Wanted’ in an economic sense and ‘welcome’ in a cultural sense. The
wanted and welcome (Triadafilopoulos & Smith, 2013) are the (highly) skilled per-
sons as in times of economic crisis they represent a key to innovation and creativ-
ity in a knowledge-based economic surrounding. The spatial movement of the
highly skilled mobiles is considered to be economically efficient and desirable
(Faist, 2013). In the case of the highly skilled migrants, the absence of a debate on
social problems concerning the integration of these migrants or any other negative
cultural coding is striking. Thus, their mobility as a privileged form of migration is
constructed through a positive economic and cultural evaluation.
Figure 1 suggests that desirable immigrants are more likely to be perceived as au-
tonomous mobile human capital holders. Undesirable immigrants, on the other hand,
Fig. 1 Typology of wanted and not wanted immigrants
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are perceived as “social problems”. Thus, even the wanted and welcome immigrants are
never perceived as citizens who are there to stay. However, their mobility is still per-
ceived as a privileged form of migration.
Compared to the wanted and welcome mobile human capital holders, guest workers
are usually “wanted but not welcome” (Zolberg, 1987). On the one hand, the immi-
grants are wanted in a general way as an external labour supply that reduces the levels
of wages in the receiving labour market so that the national labour market is more
competitive (Kindleberger, 1967). On the other hand, the guest workers are “not wel-
come” in a way that alien labour represents an undesirable “otherness”. The debates on
otherness are, for example, constructed around the concerns of the incompatibility of
Islam with democracy and are particularly focused on the subjects of gender equality,
forced marriages, honour killings as well as the wearing of the hijab, niqab and burqa
(Yurdakul & Korteweg, 2013). These immigrants are then seen as a threat to the na-
tional community and are culturally devalued (Faist, 2014). Refugees, in contrast, are
not wanted economically, but self-commitment of the nation state to respect human
rights would, in principle, guarantee a policy of openness towards refugees. Because of
this, they can be conceptualised as ‘welcome’ (Hampshire, 2013). Resettlers can be de-
fined as belonging to the community by the mainstream society through their ethnic
descent and so they are also welcome. Nevertheless, it is important here to understand
more empirically the extent to which diverse categories e.g. class, ethnicity and religion
intersect, thus guaranteeing openness towards economically unwanted migration.
Migrants who are neither utilisable in capitalist logic nor compatible with culture are
labelled as unwanted and unwelcome.
Methodology
How are migration-related classifications socially constructed and how do they manifest in
symbolic boundaries? In order to answer these questions, I analyse news articles that discuss
explicitly on the one hand the wanted and welcome and on the other hand the not wanted
and not welcome immigration to Germany. I used news articles because public debates con-
struct an arena for the “visibility, agenda-setting and framing” (Bleich, Bloemraad, & de
Graauw, 2015) of politically relevant themes and actors that are important for framing
different types of immigrants with different threats (Hellwig & Sinno, 2016). Here, Germany
is a particularly good case for understanding symbolic boundary making in liberal nation
states as we know from a previous study that the liberal paradox has become an important
feature of German public debate on immigration (Schmidtke, 2008). Although the analysis
focuses on Germany, the liberal paradox is present in other European liberal nation-states
as well. Thus, the understanding how the liberal paradox is negotiated in the German media
can contribute to the discussion which facets in other European nation-states play a key role
in explaining openness and closeness towards immigration (Hampshire, 2013). Similar to
Germany, Northern European countries faced a South-North migration from Spain, Greece,
Italy and Portugal since the 2008 financial crisis (Bartolini, Gropas, & Triandafyllidou, 2016;
O’Reilly et al., 2015).
Examining the social construction on (un-)wanted immigrants in the media by ana-
lysing their narrative structure (Keller, 2012) makes it possible to place the process of
categorisation and legitimation at the centre of the analysis in order to find out more
about the conflictual assessment of immigrants and how immigrants are ascribed into
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certain categories. In the following, I describe the process of analysis chronologically,
starting with the construction of the two case studies.
The case design of the “new guest workers” and the “poverty immigration”
The case construction was guided, on the one hand, by the empirical findings of Eder,
Rauer, and Schmidtke (2004) which identified a juxtaposition of discourses on the
threatened cultural national identity and the demographically and economically re-
quired immigration. The goal was to understand in which terms, events, narratives,
etc., the different and parallel discourses about the endangered national identity and
the skilled labour force are represented. In other words, which categories of practice
are used in the media to describe the wanted and not wanted immigrants. I identified
two leading articles in Der Spiegel (“The German Dream” (Becker et al., 2013) and
“Pallet without a Pillow” (Schmid, & Ulrich, 2013)), which explicitly contained a posi-
tive and negative normative evaluation of immigrants. These two articles served as the
starting point for my sampling. The (highly) qualified specialists were called “new guest
workers”, which migrated from Italy, Spain and Greece to Germany. The comparison
between the “generations” of guest workers instigated and informed a search for further
evidence concerning “new guest workers” in the media. The following questions were
addressed at this point: How are the guest workers retrospectively assessed? What does
integration mean for guest workers? What are the economic and cultural expectations
directed at the “new guest workers”? The article “Pallet without a Pillow”, which was
embedded in the article on the “new guest workers”, mentions “poverty immigration”
to Germany. The term “poverty immigration” is used by the media specifically to
describe the migrants from Romania and Bulgaria to Germany, who are thus depicted
as people who hope to escape extreme poverty. In contrast to the “new guest workers”,
the “poverty immigrants” are described to be low qualified and not wanted. At first
glance, “poverty immigration” seemed to be a new category for describing immigration
to Germany. The question which informed the further search for articles was: What is
meant by the category “poverty immigration”? Does this category also include or ex-
clude an ethnicization of migratory flows from the east of Europe, usually represented
in the media through terms such as gypsies or Sinti and Roma? Thus, the case of the
not wanted “poverty immigrants” could be used to explain the differences and the simi-
larities in the boundary making towards the wanted qualified “new guest workers”.
I argue that these two case studies are productive for the analysis of symbolic bound-
ary making in the German immigration discourse. First, they are ideal cases for a
comparison: How is Eastern European migration symbolically being compared with
Southern European migration under the paradigm of European free movement?
Secondly, the two case studies reflect the three key factors of the German immigration
debate which are characterized according to Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994) by
(a) a prognosis of a declining supply of labor, (b) the need to politically and socially
integrate the long-settled guest workers, and (c) the fear of a massive and uncontrolled
immigration from Eastern Europe. Therefore, a methodically controlled case descrip-
tion of “poverty immigration” and the “new guest workers” was developed. The investi-
gation period was set from 01.01.2008 to 31.07.2014 as Germany registered at this time
an increase in immigration during the European economic recession and fiscal crisis.
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Data selection and data interpretation
The data collection contained eight quality mainstream media corporations and their
respective online outlets. The selected sources had to be used as reference media by
other news formats in the national press and on television, such as the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), tagesschau.de and Der Spiegel. They had to have a left or
right-wing political tendency, such as Taz and Die Welt. The websites used as sources
had to be the most popular in the online news sector, such as Bild, Stern, Focus. The
rationale for this selection strategy was the assumption that these sources were read
directly and indirectly by a number of different groups in society and therefore had the
potential to frame a great variety of discursive statements.
The articles were selected for the entire sample in two steps. First, the total corpus
was recorded as digital archives, each tagged with a corresponding search word (“guest
workers” and “poverty immigration”). Instead of the “new guest workers” as a search
word, the term “guest workers” was preferred for the sampling strategy in order to
cover a huge variety of immigration themes.
In total, the guest worker corpus contains 2758 articles and the poverty immigration
corpus 688 articles and up to this point the corpus which contained all kinds of articles
(except reader’s letter) haven’t been examined. The articles are stored in a chronological
output, capturing the peaks and slacks of the debate (see the Additional file 1 for the
program code). The total corpus was first analysed with corpus linguistic methods
(wordlists, keyness, concordance) for each year and for each newspaper in comparison
to the total corpus. Building on these results, my empirical approach to study strategies
of boundary making is largely inductive and guided by the methodology of the
Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Essential for Grounded theory is the sim-
ultaneous process of data collection and interpretation. The following reconstruction of
the narrative structure of the “poverty immigration” is exemplifying this approach (for
an extended discussion of the methodology of both cases see Ulbricht, 2017).
The Fig. 2 shows that the debate on poverty immigration starts in 2013 and continu-
ing strongly in 2014. During the end of December 2013 and the beginning of 2014 the
newspapers published the most articles about the poverty immigrations due to a highly
controversial political statement of the Christian Democratic Union (CSU). In the CSU
paper, the burden on municipalities and cities proved to be a key reason for describing
“poverty immigration” as a problematic phenomenon at all. After the identification of
the “Deutsche Städtetag” (German Association of Cities) as an important actor in the
Fig. 2 Occurrence of articles mentioning “poverty immigration” from 2008 to 2014
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debate, documents were searched that provide clues as to when the “Deutscher Städte-
tag” becomes relevant for the first time in the debate. Their political statement on
“poverty immigration” was published on 22.01.2013 and with the knowledge that the
discourse was only constituted in 2013, it can be reasonably assumed that this is the
beginning of the debate. The statement was integrated into the sample and openly
coded sentence by sentence. It also contains its own narrative on “poverty immigration”
making a narration on causes, consequences, responsibilities, claims, and actors in-
volved. In line with the Grounded Theory, I used these causes etc. as concepts which
are developed more in detail with the method of theoretical sampling and constant
comparison. In other words, which actors use similar arguments in the representation
of the causes? Which actors omit the causes and only talk about the consequences for
the German Cities? I stopped the simultaneous selection of articles and coding until no
further variation in the sense making of a concept was found in the data. Thus, I coded
218 articles in order to trace the causal connections in a discourse, especially how
positions and strategies of ethnic boundary making are criticized and how these actors
justify their position relying on socially acceptable knowledge.
In the following, the presentation of results is not concerned with a single newspaper
text but with the presentation of typical repetitions of discursive statements on the
“new guest workers” and on “poverty immigration”. I use quotes that exemplify the
knowledge that is used to categorize and evaluate the (un-)wanted immigrants.
Results: the new guest workers as the wanted immigrants
“The new guest workers – Europe’s young elite for Germany’s economy” (Becker et
al., 2013)
In the following, the case of the “new guest workers” is introduced by outlining the histor-
ical development of the social construction of guest workers in the media in order to be able
to trace (dis-)continuities in the guest worker narrative. This is necessary because actors in
the discourse aim to reconstruct the past in a way that fits the needs of the present.
At the time of the first German-Italian recruitment agreement in 1955, the concept
of “guest workers” did not characterise the labour migrants. In the mid-fifties, the ex-
pression “guest worker” was not yet used (Hubrich, 2009). Rather, terms such as “mi-
grant workers” or, in particular, “foreign workers” (Fremdarbeiter) were deployed. The
latter was a term coined by the Nazis for the designation of forced labourers. Because
of this negative connotation with the Nazi era, the “friendlier” term “guest worker” was
supposed to replace it in the 1960s (Jung, Wengeler, & Böke, 2000). In addition, in the
1950s the view was not expressed in the media that the guest workers could possibly
remain in Germany (Ellermann, 2015). In the 1960s, the attitude towards the guest
workers in German media was initially not hostile but rather paternalistic. Up to the
first oil crisis (1973), politics and the media tried to convince the population of the ben-
efits of the recruitment (Schönwälder, 2004).
The following description of the story line on the new guest workers shows that the
narrative of the former guest workers is used to categorise and evaluate the new mi-
grants from Spain, Italy, Greece and notably not Turkey who went to Germany during
the economic recession. The debate is set from above and conducted initially by
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governmental means, advertising the economic benefits of new guest workers. This is
best symbolized by the media campaign “I want you for Gastarbeiter” (Elitz, 2010)
issued by former Federal Minister of Economy Rainer Brüderle (FDP). The central story
line of the discourse on new guest workers is homogeneous and unchallenged in its
problem definition. The assumption is that the smooth running of the German econ-
omy depends on controlled immigration. The issues of economy and immigration are
linked causally through the scarcity of labour supply, which is supposedly caused by
demographic change and thus by a lack of skilled labour. The negative correlation be-
tween population and professionals is considered to be self-evident and the truthfulness
of this relationship is never questioned. As a consequence of this assumption, the argu-
ment states that in order not to jeopardise the future growth of the national economy,
Germany needs controlled immigration, which distinguishes between desirable and un-
desirable immigrants in economic terms: “And in the global competition between
countries, it is no longer a question of shift workers but of the highly and highest
qualified. But they are rare” (Dommer, 2010).
The following typical statements show that the “new guest workers” are defined by
their specific relationship with the first wave of labour migration to West Germany: “In
contrast to the “guest workers’ wave” a few decades ago, companies are now very inter-
ested in specialists” (Dribbusch, 2011) or “We are the “new guest workers”, now we
carry a laptop and diploma with us and no carton with sausages and sardines like the
immigrants of the 60s” (Schoepp, 2011). Clear parallels are drawn to the description of
guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s. It seems as if the discourse is only able to cat-
egorise and legitimise the phenomenon of “new guest workers” as qualified specialists
through this relation. In the following short description of the storyline, I would like to
highlight the relational aspect to the former guest workers in more detail. The new
guest workers were linked to and contrasted with the old guest workers when the dis-
course focussed on the highly controversial national populist, Thilo Sarrazin, (former
member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and his claims about the accomplish-
ments of the old guest workers in Germany. Observing this debate, it is clear that state-
ments who identified group-specific characteristics of immigrants, such as religion or
ethnicity, to be at the root of “failed integration” came under heavy criticism confirming
the symbolic power of the anti-discrimination discourse. Heinz Buschkowsky, the
former mayor of the district “Neukölln” in Berlin, who heavily problematised the “failed
integration” of immigrants in the media criticised Sarrazin:
“And he does not understand why Sarrazin would have had to ethnize the problems.
It is a great pity that a factual debate on Sarrazin’s many true considerations is now
no longer possible because, with some formulations, he has made his entire concern
and analysis unquotable.” (Sarrazin, 2009)
In order to draw boundaries between the wanted and unwanted, actors referred to
the category of class of the immigrants. This is typical that spokespersons with a high
symbolic power in diverse positions in the discursive arena such as the Federal Govern-
ment, representatives of employers and employees and migrant organisations strongly
oppose and criticise an ethnicisation of immigration. This is clearly a strategy of ethnic
boundary blurring. The position of rejecting “sweeping judgments” and instead
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focusing on the individual efforts of the immigrants in the education and training mar-
ket (controlled by integration contracts) came to dominate the debate. Thus, within the
discourse, successful integration means a structural and cognitive integration – which
in turn means that learning the German language leads to labour market integration.
Learning the German language is seen as a precondition for entering the labour market.
This is symbolised by former guest workers who display upward social mobility
through education and entrepreneurship. In other words, upward social mobility is an
integration requirement. Any argument which uses the group-specific characteristics of
the immigrants is criticised by human rights activists, various political parties across
political front lines, migrant organisations as well as representatives of corporations
and unions who say these arguments are racist. What these advocates say about failed
integration is directly linked to the class position of the first guest workers; that their
education and vocational training made it difficult for them to leave behind their social
background, which is an integration requirement. One typical statement in this context
reads as follows: “It’s unfair to pin down the problems on ethnic groups. For example,
for many years we have recruited the less educated classes from Turkey as guest
workers” (Laschet, 2009). This is a strategy to de-emphasize ethnic boundaries.
In the debates, the racism critique and the defence of human rights lead to the fact
that the actors concerned explicitly take up the accusation and have to reject it: “I am
not a racist” (Sarrazin, 2010a). In order to still be able to problematise and discriminate
against immigrants, one strategy is the hierarchisation of immigrants according to their
education and qualifications. The rejection of Muslim immigrants is then subordinated
if they have the appropriate qualification level: “Those who have the qualification re-
quirements discussed in Germany under the keyword “Green Card” can, of course, also
come from a Muslim country” (Sarrazin, 2010b).
Thus, the current shared perception of various actors involved in the migration de-
bate in the German media tend to agree that there is a close link between economic
productivity and integration into society. Being a good migrant is located in the value
of economically productive individuals, which is represented in the discourse by the
label “new guest workers”. It is assumed, that the new migrants already possess or are
willing to learn these desired properties mentioned above, in comparison to those guest
workers who came in the 50s and 60s.
In principle, the term “new guest workers” is not a contested term. First of all, the
highly qualified guest workers are not considered to be permanent migrants: “The gen-
eration of young Italians stands for mobility, not necessarily for permanent migration”
(Link, 2012). The main knowledge to categorise and evaluate the “new guest workers”
is not derived from the integration debate, but through the economic competitiveness
of human capital. What counts are the capabilities of the autonomous citizen who has
sufficient academic and vocational qualifications or who has individual motivation and
competence of its appropriation so that he or she is not dependent on welfare spending
and has a self-reliant life. And according to theses capacities, it is expected that if these
migrants stay permanently then they can more successfully be integrated into society
on a cultural level than the first guest workers. So the expectation is, so to speak, that
the “new guest workers” are not following their ethnic community but their own career
in Germany. Through this expectation the contradictory nature of the term “new guest
workers” is revealed. The wanted migrant workers are still addressed as guests and not
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as immigrants, but if permanent migration is likely, the integration scenario is more
promising than with the first guest workers.
Results: poverty immigration as the not wanted immigrants
“Special social problems arise when unskilled, unqualified, uneducated workers from
Romania and Bulgaria come to Germany.” (FAZ, 2014)
The second case illustrates the shifting boundaries in the discourse about “poverty
immigration” in Germany. The discourse about “poverty immigration” does not
undergo a constant debate but is updated on important events.
The debate on the “poverty immigration” was initiated at the beginning of 2013 by a
political position paper of the German City Council. On 22 January 2013, the German
City Council asked the Federal Government to recognise the problem of “poverty im-
migration” and, accordingly, to support cities and municipalities financially in terms of
integration. According to the German City Council, the consequences are obvious: On
the one hand, the City Council Paper argued that traffickers exploit the “poor immi-
grants” from Romania and Bulgaria in their ‘miserable’ situation and therefore are in
need of protection. This can lead to the situation that poor immigrants are gaining il-
legal income, working for dumping wages or pursuing prostitution and begging, thus
undermining the social order in different social contexts. On the other hand, the City
Council argues that “poverty immigration” in cities and municipalities leads to consid-
erable costs in the areas of the education, social and health care system as well as in
the employment and housing market. The City Council warns that right wing, xeno-
phobic forces are exploiting the situation in their favour and this ultimately complicates
the integration of the poor immigrants.
The Federal Government takes up this position in February. The Federal Minister of
the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU), announces that he will halt “poverty immigra-
tion” from Romania and Bulgaria by vetoing the Schengen accession of these countries.
In his statements, he reduces the debate about “poverty immigration” to the restriction
of migration from Romania and Bulgaria: “Whoever comes to collect social benefits
must be effectively deterred, said Friedrich” (“Veto gegen Schengen-Beitritt”, 2013).
Friedrich thus relied on the knowledge of social burden in order to deploy a strategy of
narrowing boundaries to argue against the European freedom of movement for Roma-
nian and Bulgarian citizens. Here, the position of the German City Council is not taken
up that “poverty immigration” is not primarily the cause of the social problems but in
fact intensifies the social problems that already exist in the city.
He continues to carry forward the position of social burden, which was only partially
mentioned by the German City Council and excludes their statements on exploitation
and their concern about the danger of right wing instrumentalisation. His statements
take centre stage in the discourse on poverty migration because from this time onwards
the issue of poor peoples’ international mobility within Europe becomes part of a dis-
cussion about the pros and cons of free European movement.: “Free movement also
has a flip side of the coin” (FOCUS, 2013).
The burden for Germany is understood, above all, as a burden for the German wel-
fare state. According to the discourse reproduced in the media, the influx of “poor
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immigrants” may lead to rising rents for the long-term unemployed, an increase in state
support to guarantee education, health care and other essential social support for poor
migrant families who cannot assume these costs independently. The media portrays
that the poverty immigrants increasingly compete with homeless Germans for shelter.
The social comparison of the immigrants from Rumania and Bulgaria to the German
unemployed and the German homeless designate the social position they have in the
social space.
The positive arguments made about “poverty immigration” are mainly con-
structed by refuting the negative aspects mentioned above. From this
pro-immigration perspective, “poverty immigration” is not constructed as a burden
for the social welfare state. Instead, there is the impression that Germany profits
economically from these immigrants. This claim is demonstrated using elaborate
statistics stating that poor migrants are not necessarily poorly qualified: “25 per
cent have a university degree, 40 per cent vocational training, 35 per cent have no
qualifications, according to a study by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung (Institute for Employment Research)” (“Stürmen Rumänen und
Bulgaren”, 2013). This is in direct opposition to the former argument of poverty
immigrants being a burden, and with qualified immigration the deficit of skilled
workers and the challenges of demographic change can be counteracted. In the
dispute over the two sides of the freedom of movement coin, the poor immigrants
are defined either as an economic burden or as an economic asset. The different
positions are seen as a corrective critique within an economic perspective.
In the first phase of the debate, the restriction of “poverty immigration” to Germany is
strongly associated with a restriction of Roma immigration: “For weeks now, the Federal
Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, has urged the need to prevent the immigra-
tion of poverty from Roma to Germany” (Dribbusch, 2013). He argues that the incentives
for Sinti and Roma to come to Germany have to be reduced by significantly improving the
living conditions in the countries of origin. When speaking about the Roma, the discourse
does not coherently represent the Roma. Among other things, the Roma’s family situation
and their integration into the city is seen as very problematic for many actors who seek to
justify the restriction of “poverty immigration”: “Roma and Sinti are to be considered differ-
ent because they live in large family associations. Integration measures are thus becoming
more and more difficult” (FOCUS, 2013). In addition, the Roma are described as poorly ed-
ucated which is said to cause immediate problems on the labour market: “The concern is
huge that precisely these people seek refuge in Germany in order to benefit from social wel-
fare” (“Droht Deutschland eine Roma-Welle?”, 2013). At the same time, the issue of “pov-
erty immigration” and Roma is also considered a “delicate issue” (Seibel, 2013) because of
the racist suspicion that is inevitably raised. This anti-discrimination position refutes a gen-
eral suspicion against a minority and points out the problematic linkage between attributing
negative stereotypes to a whole minority. Advocates of the poverty immigration argue that
the main problem lies in the catastrophic living conditions of Roma in their homelands.
Thus, in the debate we find controversial statements leading to an intensified discrimin-
ation, a fact that is also critically reflected. These positions run parallel in the discourse and
do not relate to each other. In other words, critical left-wing newspapers report on the dis-
crimination of Roma whereas the mainstream tabloid press like the “Bild” newspaper keeps
quiet about it.
Ulbricht Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:31 Page 11 of 19
These observations change dramatically in the New Year’s debate of 2013/14. The
CSU paper “Do not encourage poverty in the municipalities” is the starting point of the
New Year’s debate. The CSU rejects the “immigration of poverty” into “our social se-
curity systems” and wants to take action against the ‘abuse’ of European free movement
under the motto “those who cheat, go.” The CSU calls for a general suspension of
social benefits for the first 3 months of stay in Germany and a re-entry ban on social
fraud. The CSU justify this position by using the argument about financial burden on
the German welfare state. The CSU fears that German citizens will turn against
European freedom of movement as a result of massive “poverty immigration”. A
boundary spanning discursive coalition of political, economic, and social actors builds
up against the CSU. The criticism of the CSU is clear and uniform. The freedom of
movement is defended, on the one hand, by the argument of economic necessity and,
on the other hand, by the moral argument that the position of the CSU is openly racist
and xenophobic. The joint declaration of DGB (German Trade Union Confederation)
and BDA (Federation of German Employers) on the freedom of movement in Europe is
widely cited in the media as an argument against the CSU and states: “The right to
settle in another country and to work is one of the basic values of the European Union.
It makes an important contribution for securing skilled workers, to the competitiveness
of the German and European economy and to cultural diversity […]” (Deutscher
Gewerkschafts Bund, 2014). Under the umbrella of a social welfare association, more
than 150 migrant organisations protest against the CSU: “There is no continuing abuse
of the free movement of persons in Europe by “poverty immigrants”.” (Spiegel Online,
2014). They appeal to the CSU: “Please prevent a campaign taking place at the expense
of the migrants that plays on the fears of the citizens” (Spiegel Online, 2014). In the
end, when the term “social benefit tourism” is chosen as the ugliest word of the year
(14.01.2014), the debate is normatively clear: “poverty immigration” does not exist and
the word is highly problematic and can no longer be used. The generalisation of all
immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria as synonymous with “poverty immigration” is
heavily problematised by political opponents relying on employment statistics of the
Institute for Employment Research. Then, some remarkable shifts in the positions of
the discourse are observed that indicate the power of anti-discrimination positions
together with a positive economic evaluation of the so called “poverty immigration” in
the discourse. The formerly strongly dramatising media, such as Bild, Focus and Die
Welt clearly stand up for the immigration of people from Romania and Bulgaria or
criticise the fear of “poverty immigration” which they had previously fuelled by describ-
ing the immigration as a wave which was flooding German cities. Actors generally dis-
sociate themselves from the use of the term in the discourse: “The ghost of mass
immigration” (Schütz, 2014), which the CSU propagates, is unmasked as a myth, show-
ing that Germany is economically profiting from this “poverty immigration”. At the
end of the debate in May 2014, the term “poverty immigration” vanishes from the
discourse as fast as it popped up at the beginning of 2013. This shows what Bourdieu
called the “symbolic efficacy”, which depends on the degree to which the categories
proposed are founded in reality (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23). If the phenomenon is declared
by a powerful coalition of scientists and other public administrations to not exist in
reality, the symbolic struggle to define the term “poverty immigration” brought up by
the Federal Minister of the Interior will lead nowhere.
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At the end of the New Year’s debate, when the question was clarified whether
“poverty immigration” is an enrichment or burden, the term “poverty immigration” was
considered defamatory. For example, Die Welt comments on January 14, 2016:
“POVERTY IMMIGRATION: The CSU uses the term poverty immigrants to describe
low-skilled migrants who want to take, in the party’s opinion, advantage of social bene-
fits in Germany, but lack opportunities in the labour market. Experts, however, believe
it is unjustified to speak categorically of poverty immigration from Bulgaria and
Romania. Although immigrants from these countries are on average less well-qualified,
the unemployment rate for both nationalities in mid-2013 was below the average of the
population as a whole and well below that of other migrant groups.”
This editorial position by Die Welt on the discourse comes at the end of the debate. It
gives the impression that this definition of the phenomenon was clear right from the
beginning but this definition lacks the cultural interpretive schema of the Roma. At the
beginning “poverty immigration” was very much about Roma immigration as the restric-
tion of immigration is also explicitly linked in the media to the Roma: “Reduce incentives
for the Sinti and Roma” (Bauer, 2013). Concerning the question of how this change in
sense-making came about, I argue that the knowledge about the positive economic impact
of the poverty immigration has become the dominant principle to evaluate immigrants in
the discourse underscored by the anti-discrimination against the Roma immigration. The
use of the narrative of the two sides of the coin “of European free movement” is an
economic interpretation of migration in Europe. In this positive information campaign in
the media on the immigration from Bulgaria and Romania it can be shown how the
economic interpretation of migration at the same time displaces an ethnicisation of the
migration. On the basis of statistics and expert opinion in the debates, it is elaborately
demonstrated that the “poor immigrants” are generally not badly educated. On the
contrary, 25% have a university degree. In this positive reversal of the argumentation,
however, the exclusion of Roma is no longer subject to the debate. In other words, the
economic positively accessed migrants are then not subject to ethnicisation processes.
In summary, the analysis of the debate demonstrates how changeable a discourse on
migration can be. Initially described as a dangerous mass phenomenon threatening
Germany’s social security system, the problem is declared to be non-existent in a remark-
able consensus in the course of determining the phenomenon of “poverty immigration”.
Discussion and conclusion
How are wanted and unwanted immigrants socially constructed in German immigra-
tion discourse? The examples of “new guest worker” and “poverty immigration” have
shown which categories are used in this boundary making and which of them are
recognised in the public debate as legitimate. The question looms large of whether
political conflicts are constructed by means of various categories, such as ethnicity,
religion or gender. The common theory is that in modern societies conflicts tend to
develop from class politics to cultural politics (from class to culture) (Hechter, 2004).
In both case studies the construction of wanted and unwanted immigrants in
Germany was carried out with the characteristic of the class position, which differenti-
ates immigrants along the meritocratic triad of social status definitions (education,
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occupation, income). Those, who are being productive and active on the labour market
are wanted. This corresponds to the neoliberal currents that underlie the transform-
ation of the “European” social project (Soysal, 2012), which privileges the individual as
the main force for social cohesion and solidarity.
This meritocratic idea was clearly evident during the 2008–2014 investigation period,
both in the case of the “new guest workers” and “poverty migration”. Here, class as a
category of practice produces a consensus on the question of who is a wanted and who
is an unwanted immigrant. First, class is a recognised as a legitimate boundary in the
way that it is the least critical position. Second, class is used by political actors who
claim to be advocates of the symbolically excluded, as well as from actors who symbol-
ically exclude immigrants and have to rely on legitimate justifications of their positions.
Thus, class is recognised as transcendent by competing actors.
Moreover, this analysis requires us to put more (theoretical) emphasis on the distinct
categories that are used in the process of boundary making, eo ipso group making. We
can ask whether class as the dominant practice of categorization is different for the
possibility of boundary crossing than for example religion. Here, the boundary is basic-
ally open and exceedable for immigrants through an individual effort in the realm of
education, income and jobs. Learning languages and skills usually have additive effects.
Unlike religion, that employs socially exclusive categories to create differences. You
can’t be a Muslim and a Christian at the same time. It is a common sociological idea
that the act of boundary making creates the groups (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2013) but
this analysis shows that in the act of demarcation the content of the boundary making
(class, ethnicity, religion) is crucial to understand the relations between groups.
In this study I was especially concerned to specify the reasons for the “marketisation”
of migration (Favell & Hansen, 2002). I argue that this class-based construction of
(un-)wanted immigrants is functional in the discourse on migration. It is seen as a legit-
imate strategy to exclude people who lack economic performance without engaging in
race, class, nationality or a discussion on gender because everybody is judged on an
equal basis, i.e. on human capital. Thus, the study demonstrates how the “marketisa-
tion” of migration is reinforced by a discourse on human rights that decries discrimin-
ation that is based on ascriptive categories, thus opening up discursive possibilities for
economic boundary making. The blurring of ethnic and religious boundaries is
enforced by the human rights discourse that stigmatises group-level exclusion, but en-
ables individual-level exclusion based on human capital. This does not mean that the
importance of other categories, such as ethnicity or religion, becomes irrelevant in the
categorisation of wanted and unwanted immigrants in the immigration discourse, but
in the context of the public debate these categories are highly fragile and require justifi-
cation. The characteristics of the competences, qualifications and economic activities of
the immigrants are more acceptable in the discourse. They have a dominant place in
the discourse, both in the construction of desirability and in the case of undesirability,
since they are not subjected to a criticism. These characteristics are instead self-evident
and widely recognised.
The narrative of the guest worker is once again active to describe the wanted immi-
grants in Germany. Thus, the analysis demonstrated that Gary Freeman was correct in
1995 when he observed that “the politics of immigration in these states is haunted by
the mistakes, failures, and unforeseen consequences of the guest worker era (...) This
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message is so deeply seared into the public’s consciousness (...)” (Freeman, 1995, p.
890). But at this point, it is appropriate to look more closely at the relationship between
the categories of ethnicity and class. We might think that an ethnicised boundary mak-
ing is illegitimate but there is a complex interrelationship between class and the ethni-
city category which needs to be considered more in detail. The term guest worker is a
highly ethnicised category in itself. As we know from the studies of Schönwälder (2004)
“why Germany’s guest workers were largely Europeans” the former officials of the gov-
ernment tried to keep out Africans and Asians in order to have tighter immigration
controls. This was due to the fear in the government’s opinion that non-European im-
migrants were more likely to remain in Germany. In essence, German officials of the
government have assumed that European migrant workers can be better managed.
Similarly, the drafting of the German Migration Law from 2000 was influenced by past
integration concerns with the resident Turkish population in Germany (Paul, 2013).
One might think now that there is certainly a wide gap between the statements made
in the public debate and the action of policy makers behind closed doors. Since 2011
the fundamental German Labour Migration policy goal is to secure skilled labour
supply and to fight the demographic crisis by a heightened and more coordinated
EU Mobility (Paul, 2016). Most importantly, the guest worker discourse in the media
serves exactly this purpose as it advertises the recruitment of intra-European labour.
More specifically, when the former Minister of economic affairs introduced his cam-
paign “I want you for Gastarbeiter” in the media, a homogenous interpretation of
the immigrants by diverse actors as qualified new guest workers was evolving and
establishing. Thus, editorials like “The German Dream” (Becker et al., 2013)
legitimizes the migration from southern Europe by describing them in comparison
to the old guest workers as better qualified and their prospects for a better
social-cultural integration scenario are also more promising. At the same time the
discourse leaves out representations of Turkish immigrants. The new guest workers
are not Turkish guest worker.
Hence, the boundary making in the symbolic and policy realm are strikingly similar:
A labour recruitment hierarchy is based on ethnicity in order to manage migration. In
this sense, there is a path dependency of the construction of desired immigrants, which
basically rests on ethnic categories but which is presented in the media discourse in a
liberal fashion. Despite the predominance of performance characteristics in the con-
struction of desirable immigrants, ethnicity plays a central role in the form of national
affiliation. This means that the individualistic merit-based construction of desirability
pre-excludes the culturally unwanted immigrants. This should stimulate interest in fur-
ther research, as it can be argued that ethnic boundaries remain stable where they seem
to change in the liberal context.
At the same time, the limitation of the cases of the “new guest workers” and the
“poor immigrants” becomes obvious. The examination of the presented thesis would
succeed by answering the question of how (highly) qualified non-white immigrants or
non-white Europeans are represented in the immigration discourse. In the period
2008–2014, however, this category has not been reported in both cases and therefore
no comparative statements can be made. However, I consider this category to be
central in order to study the intersection between the attributions of achievement to
certain ethnic groups.
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In summary, the findings point to fact that it is not only important to show which
categories are involved in the symbolic boundary making but to understand more the
relationship between them, when analysing the valuation of immigrants. From the re-
sults I obtained, it is clear that the capitalist and universalist facets are the main drivers
of the categorization and evaluation of immigrants. The Government, all political
parties in the German Bundestag except the CSU, unions, together with employers’
associations and representatives of migrant organizations refer to these facets when
differentiating between wanted and unwanted immigrants. Likewise, we find a
hierarchy of categories in the discourse. Qualification is more crucial than the cultural
background. The (highly) qualified people are not considered to be immigrants but
mobile people. We can ask if this distinction between mobility and migration is
increasing in an era of right-wing populism in order to secure skilled labour.
Moreover, a relationship between ethnicity and class can be assumed. The lower the so-
cial status of immigrants and thus the higher the probability of social dependency on the
welfare state, the more likely it is that immigrants are symbolically ethnicised. In the guest
worker discourse, it has been shown that immigrants who appear unfit for the labour
market have been depreciated in their value for the German society. Then, the ethnicisa-
tion is cited as a justification for the lack of integration on the labour market. In the ‘pov-
erty immigration’ discourse, it was shown that when poverty migrants were proved to be
of economic benefit then this led conversely to a decrease in ethnicisation.
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